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Trinity College Dublin and CEPR
Abstract: The Irish banking system has been, in effect, on a life-support system since September
2008. Complacency resulted in the banks fuelling the late stage of an obvious construction bubble
with massive foreign borrowing, leaving them exposed to solvency and liquidity risks which in
past times would have been inconceivable. The Government’s steps to put the system back on a
sound basis must have regard both to protecting taxpayers’ interests and to ensuring that credit
flows to the economy are not hampered by inadequate capital or liquidity. 
I INTRODUCTION  AND  SUMMARY
T
he Irish banking system is on a life-support system since the Government
startled the financial world by announcing, on September 30, 2008, a two-
year blanket guarantee of the liabilities of Irish-controlled banks, apparently
triggered by the inability of one bank to roll-over its foreign borrowings. 
The guarantee and subsequent events did little for the shareholders of
Irish banks: by end-year (December 2008) the share price of three of the four
listed banks was between 5 and 7 per cent of their peak value reached in early
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within days. According to their published accounts, the book value of equity in
the main banks was then a multiple of almost eight times the market price.
Indeed, the market was capitalising the banks at less – in two cases much less
– than their last reported full year’s profit. The share prices of the two main
banks subsequently dipped even lower – falling in early March 2009 to 1 per
cent of their peak value before subsequently recovering somewhat. By end-
April it was generally expected that the State would soon take a large majority
equity stake in both. 
Although international pressures contributed to the timing, intensity and
depth of the Irish banking crisis, the underlying cause of the problem was
domestic and classic: too much mortgage lending (financed by heavy foreign
borrowing by the banks) into an unsustainable housing price and construction
boom. The boom seemed credible to enough borrowers given sharply lower
interest rates with adoption of the euro on top of the protracted expansion in
output, employment and population especially from the mid-1990s. 
Although most economists had foreseen – and many publicly forecast – a
severe correction in the price of housing, few confidently predicted bank
solvency problems. Nor could they have given that public information about
loan-to-value ratios and additional securities taken by lenders was sketchy:
published results of official stress tests were also relatively uninformative. 
Besides, there was good reason to have confidence in the ability of banks
to insulate themselves, even if they were making loans to finance property
purchases based on implausible projections. How could traditionally conserva  -
tive banks – some of them with a 200-year history – have been so careless as
to leave themselves exposed in such a conspicuous and obvious property
bubble? 
The banks, frightened by what has happened, have belatedly tightened
lending conditions, though it is not obvious that they are all taking sufficiently
decisive action to prevent big debtors with property-related difficulties from
either running away from their obligations or alternatively gambling for
resurrection.
The Government recognised that recapitalisation was going to be needed
for each of the banks if it was to continue in operation. The injection of €3.5
billion into each of the two largest banks is most unlikely to be the end of the
story here, as the proposed purchase by the new state asset management
company National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) of a large block of
property-related loans at discounted prices is likely to expose further capital
deficiencies. The Government intends to take an equity stake in return: this is
208 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
1 And down between two-thirds and three-quarters on their pre-guarantee levels. an essential minimum to protect the taxpayer’s interest. Indeed, the stake is
likely to be a large one, possibly full ownership. Some additional financial
restructuring ideas that could provide better risk-sharing should also be
explored. 
Thorough recapitalisation should help rebuild bank lending confidence,
recovery here will be slow. While regulation has self-evidently failed,
imposition of arbitrary new restrictions, for example aimed at reducing banks’
loan-to-deposit ratios, should be avoided to ensure that availability of loanable
funds does not become an additional constraint. 
In order to avoid unfair and regressive bailouts for disappointed
speculators, and to protect the public finances, any government relief for
distressed and uncreditworthy borrowers should be mainly through social
welfare-type policies rather than by directing banks either to lend or to
forbear. 
II  DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM
The banks got into trouble because they got caught up in the mass
psychology of an unprecedented property bubble – the steepest and longest of
the several national property bubbles of the late 1990s and early 2000s around
the world.2 Banks had not been central to the financing of the export-led Celtic
Tiger period of the Irish economy which ended about 2000 (Honohan, 2006).
However, they began to increase the share of their assets in property-related
lending from less than 40 per cent before 2002 to over 60 per cent by 2006. 
In contrast to the United States, where much of the growth in property-
related lending was driven by the technology of automated credit appraisal for
subprime borrowers and the securitisation of mortgages, Irish property
lending technology was traditional. Only the scale was new. From 2003 the
banks leveraged their local resources with enormous borrowings from abroad
(easily available due to the global savings glut, and also to the lack of exchange
rate risk for euro borrowing). At the end of 2003, net indebtedness of Irish
banks to the rest of the world was just 10 per cent of GDP. By early 2008 that
had jumped to over 60 per cent (Figure 1 – which covers all credit institutions
and not just mortgage lenders). 
The preconditions for growing housing demand gradually emerged with
the sustained export-led real economic expansion from 1988 and especially
from 1994 (Celtic Tiger period). Jobs were plentiful, net immigration sizeable
and there was a growing sense of economic security. But it was Economic and
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2 Between 1994 and 2007 average real house prices tripled.Monetary Union (EMU) entry that really started the housing price surge by
sharply lowering nominal and real interest rates, thereby lifting equilibrium
asset prices (Figure 2). The combination of higher population, higher income
and lower actual and pros  pective mortgage interest rates clearly provided a
straightforward upward shift in demand, i.e. in the willingness and ability to
pay for housing.3
The problem is that property prices developed their own momentum and
overshot equilibrium levels as calculated by all models. In effect, purchasers
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3 Supply response should, of course, in time fully offset this capitalisation effect for standard
houses built on marginal land – e.g. far from a city centre.
Table 1: Book and Market Value of Irish Listed Banks
Book Value  Market All Time Share  Share 
of Equity  Value of  High Share Price,  Price,
Capital Last Equity, End- Price End- Lowest 
Annual ,  December € December (March,
Report 2008, 2008, 2009),
€bn  € bn € €
Allied Irish Banks AIB  8.4  1.5  23.95 (Feb 07)  1.73  0.28 
Bank of Ireland 6.5 0.9 18.65 (Feb 07) 0.83 0.12
Irish Life and Permanent 2.6 0.4 22.63 (Feb 07) 1.57 0.69
Anglo Irish Bank 4.1 0.1 17.53 (Jun 07) 0.17 0.12
Source: Bank Annual Reports and daily listing of Irish Stock Exchange www.ise.ie
Figure 1: Net Borrowing Of Irish Banks From Abroad (Stock) 
1999Q1-2009Q1
Source: Central Bank Quarterly Bulletin, Table C3.RESOLVING IRELAND’S BANKING CRISIS 211
Figure 2: Real Interest Rates 1983-2007
Figure 3: Irish House Prices (deflated by CPI), 1970-2008
Source: Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government.increasingly built in an expected continuation in the increase of the relative
price of housing. 
This was not just a price bubble (Figure 3). Importantly, it also involved a
sharp increase in construction. House completions soared and, overall, the
share of the growing workforce engaged in construction jumped from about 7
per cent in the early and mid-1990s to over 13 per cent by 2007 (Figures 4,5).
And residential construction soared well beyond population. According to the
2006 census of population, some 15 per cent of the housing stock was vacant4
at census date, mostly reflecting speculative purchasing of additional housing
by prosperous households (less than 3 percentage points of that being holiday
homes). Of course this speculative element quickly vanished as a positive
contribution to demand as soon as prices started to drop and revealed to
investors – or confirmed them in their suspicions – that relying on continued
house-price inflation was unwise. 
Without large-scale foreign borrowing by the banks, the property boom
could not have grown as it did. And the banks were certainly not tightening
credit conditions as the prices rose (Figure 6). However, it is less clear that
credit was the main driver before 2002. Timing relationships between credit
expansion and house price increases suggest that bank behaviour may have
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Figure 4: Employment in Construction 1990-2008
4 Or 216,000 housing units. This contrasts with the figure of 40,000 sometimes mentioned by
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Figure 5: Housing Completions 1970-2008
Source: Department of Environment Heritage and Local Government.
Figure 6: Credit Supply and Demand Conditions as Reported by Banks
2003-2009
Source: CBFSAI: ECB Lending Survey, various dates. “3” represents no change from
previous survey. Higher numbers imply easing supply conditions and greater demand;
lower numbers imply the opposite.begun to drive the inflation from about 2003 on (Figure 7). But demand for
credit was certainly strong throughout. Indeed, a renewed acceleration of
house prices from 2003 was also fuelled by a reversal of earlier tax tightening,
reinforcing Ireland’s tax bias towards construction (cf. Barham, 2004; Rae and
Van den Noord, 2006).
Given how comfortably the Irish banks had survived severe recessions in
the mid-1950s, the 1970s and the 1980s – the last of which especially involving
a sharp fall in real house prices – it is surprising that these traditionally
conservative institutions succumbed to financing such an extravagant price
and construction bubble. 
One factor that might have encouraged bank and regulator complacency is
that the previous house price bubble of the 1970s took place in an environment
of rapid general inflation. Real repayment of mortgage loans was in such
circumstances front-loaded so that, by the time that bubble burst and house
prices were falling in real terms, the real value of the remaining debt for most
borrowers was low. 
There is also the fact that banks had not been the main players in the
residential mortgage market until the late 1980s: before then, fiscal
privileges5 ensured that building societies held the lion’s share of that
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5 The income tax treatment of deposit interest at building societies, whereby an all-in composite
rate of tax was applied at source, had allowed building societies to out-compete banks for the
deposits of high-rate individual taxpayers.
Figure 7: Credit and House Prices – Rolling 3-Month Growth Rate
Source: CBFSAI for credit; ILP-ESRI for House Prices.business. Thus the banks were not steeped in the deeply ingrained suspicion
of the mortgage market as a source of systemic difficulties that now prevails
in, for example, Japanese banks. 
III  EARLY WARNING?
The freezing of interbank markets was a global event, whose severity,
duration and extent were foreseen by few. But to what extent were the
solvency difficulties of the Irish banks foreseen by analysts, by the Irish
Financial Regulator, or even by academic economists and commentators? 
Calling the Housing Market Excesses
The housing market excesses were commented upon by numerous
economists from the late 1990s. External reviews by the IMF and the OECD
regularly focused on this issue (cf. IMF, 2004; Rae and Van den Noord, 2006).
Most of the debate centred upon the sustainability of the jump in house prices.
By no later than 2003-04 a large majority view (though not universally held)
was that prices had overshot the equilibrium and would inevitably fall.6 The
scale of construction activity also began to cause concern, as did the worsening
wage competitiveness situation (Fitz Gerald, 2005, Duffy, Fitz Gerald and
Kearney, 2005; Honohan and Leddin, 2006). Honohan (2006) highlighted the
extent of foreign borrowing being used to finance the boom. Most, though not
all, studies foresaw a downturn in property prices triggering recessionary
pressures likely to be led by a contraction in housing construction. 
Drawing the Implications for Banks – A Lack of Information
Writing in September 2007, Kelly (2007b) was the first academic
economist to question openly whether the Irish banks could survive the
expected fall in house prices and associated recession. At that stage, neither
he nor other commentators outside of the banking and regulatory community
had the kind of detailed information which would allow verification of the
banks’ assertions that they had protected themselves sufficiently with
independent guarantees and prudent underwriting. 
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6 This is not the place for a full account of econometric studies of house prices. Early contributions
were Murphy (1998) and Roche (1999). Probably the most satisfactory treatment is by Murphy
(2005); the most trenchant by Kelly (2006, 2007a), all of which contain further references,
including to stockbroker economists – not all of whom were incorrigible boosters, contrary to
popular opinion. As reported in Honohan (2006), even the relatively optimistic calculations of
Murphy (2005) implied that, by mid-2004, equilibrium prices were at least 26 per cent below
actual.True, the Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government
does report the distribution of loan-to-value (LTV) ratios for the number of new
loans, and these numbers7 were far from reassuring. They show a sharp jump
in high LTVs in 2005 and 2006: by 2006, fully two-thirds of loans to first time
buyers had LTV in excess of 90 per cent; one-third were getting 100 per cent
LTV loans (Figure 8).8
If the banks had been conservative before, this certainly seems to have
changed by 2006. To be sure, LTV is only one indicator of the security of a loan.
But, given the evidently fragile state of the market by 2005 and the
exceptional prices at which houses were selling, it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that bank lending decisions had begun to lose touch with reality.9
Negligible Regulatory Response
It was around this point that the Regulator tightened capital
requirements, requiring “banks to set aside much more capital” in relation to
high loan-to-value ratio loans (Neary, 2008). But how much more capital? The
regulation of 31 March 2006 increased total capital required to back a 100 per
cent loan-to-value ratio mortgage from 4 per cent of the loan to just 4.8 per
cent – a negligible increase of just €4,000 on a loan of €500,000. I don’t see
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Figure 8: Distribution of Mortgage Loans by Initial Loan-To-Value 
Ratio 2004-7
Source: Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government.
7 There is some question over whether the data adequately capture the real situation.
8 The maturity of new loans also lengthened dramatically. By 2007 more than three-fifths of first
time borrowers were getting loans of more than 30 years’ maturity, compared with less than a
quarter in 2004.
9 Kearns (2004) looked at the other side of the coin: affordability of debt from the household’s point
of view, using data from the Central Statistics Office Household Budget Survey.how anyone could have regarded that as “much more capital” or as a
significant deterrent to high loan-to-value ratios. Some other measures were
also taken by the Regulator, but the proof of the pudding is in the eating –
LTVs continued to grow in 2006.
A very simple warning sign used by most regulators to identify a bank
exposed to increased risk is rapid balance sheet growth. An annual real growth
rate of 20 per cent is often taken as the trigger. Each of the locally-controlled
banks had at least one year in which this threshold was triggered. One of
them, Anglo Irish Bank, crossed it in eight of nine years, and indeed its
average annual rate of growth 1998-2007 was 36 per cent. Another, Irish
Nationwide, crossed the line six out of the nine years, for an average rate of
growth over the nine years of just above 20 per cent (Figure 9). So this was a
very obvious and public danger sign not only for these two banks, but because
of the potentially destabilising effect of reckless competition on the entire
sector (Honohan, 1997). The rapid growth in the market share of Anglo Irish
(from 3 to 18 per cent of the total assets of the six locally-controlled
institutions that subsequently received the Government guarantee) was
certainly an important influence inducing the other banks to relax lending
terms to avoid losing even more market share.10
Still, neither balance sheet and other published data for the individual
institutions, LTV data, nor the aggregate information about house prices and
loan volumes really tells us what we need to know about the net exposure of
the banks to risks from this lending, nor about whether they were being
adequately compensated for the risks. Even the voluminous information
reported to the stock exchanges by the listed banks (for example in their 20-F
reports prepared for the US Securities and Exchange Commission) focused on
loans where delinquencies had already occurred or were anticipated, and had
little to say about other parts of the portfolio which might come under pressure
if there was a major downturn in house prices, combined with a rise in
unemployment. Furthermore, although isolated pieces of information about
the bank funding of developers were made public, no-one had information on
the extent to which the developers’ own money was at risk in the seemingly
ever-larger land deals that were part bank-financed. 
Stress-Tests Relied on Banks’ Own Projections, or Assumed Stresses that were
Too Small
The Regulator started stress-testing exercises in the context of the IMF-
World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), and published the
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10 Some of the foreign-owned banks, notably new entrant HBOS, which had acquired the
privatised ICC bank, also pursued a particularly aggressive growth strategy.findings against the background of the IMF’s FSAP update in 2006 (IMF, 2006;
CBFSAI, 2006). This stress-testing exercise could have been based on all of the
relevant information, as banks may be required to provide very detailed
information to the Regulator. The published account of the exercise did reveal
some interesting, not very reassuring, pieces of information. For instance, it
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Figure 9: Growth Rates of Six Irish Banks, 1999-2008
Line: Total assets at end of each accounting year € billion (RHS).
Bar: Percentage real growth rate (LHS).
Source: Bank Annual Reports.was stated that, although between 26-33 per cent of the stock of banks’
residential mortgage loans had LTV ratios above 75 per cent, only 1.6-6.1 per
cent had LTV ratios over 92 per cent.
Stress tests purport to model the condition of banks in an “extreme but
plausible” scenario. While stress tests can be useful to identify the outlier
institutions particularly at risk, they are rarely in my experience very
informative about systemic risks. The problem is that the future configuration
of stresses is unlikely to be the same as in the past. The stress tests performed
by the Central Bank and Financial Services Regulatory Authority of Ireland
(CBFSAI) (2006) were predicated on a rather modest 20 per cent fall in house
prices, and certain other adverse developments. This scenario was presented
to the banks, who were apparently asked to compute the consequences for
their balance sheet and operating income. Presumably there was some further
iteration between the banks and the Regulator. One hopes that the Regulator
did not take the very favourable results of this “bottom-up” self-test too
seriously. In addition, the Regulator computed a “top-down” stress test. This
was done by assuming that a percentage of residential mortgages would
default and that the loss-given-default ratio would be 75 per cent of the loan
(i.e. only 25 per cent of each defaulted loan assumed to be recoverable). The
assumed percentage of defaults ranged up to six times the existing share of
non-performing loans. While this might seem a high multiple, it corresponds
to an average default rate of just over 5 per cent; anyway, it seems almost
entirely arbitrary. It is not clear whether there was any explicit analysis of
developer loans in this stress test. If not, this would have been a serious
omission given the apparent extent and vulnerability of these loans. The
published findings do not state if all banks would have remained solvent
under this stress test, but even it they would have, such a calculation could not
have justified a complacent approach. 
Solvency of the Banks
The prospective house price falls, combined with the global recession, now
presents a much worse scenario now than envisaged in the Regulator’s 2006
stress tests. Still, we lack firm and detailed data. As is well known to students
of similar banking crises, bank accounting data is very slow to recognise a
deterioration in the true recoverable value of loans, mainly because of banker
over-optimism in the face of an objective deterioration, and also because of
constraints relating to accounting conventions (including the new
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)). As a result, bank
accounts at this stage in the crisis are almost sure to overstate the true
underlying value of bank capital.
Since the mortgage-related loan losses are sure to crystallise over an
extended period, could an accumulation of retained earnings from other lines
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The decisive reason for questioning this sunny hope lies in the fact that,
despite having every incentive to do so, and despite having provided much
more information than heretofore about their exposure to loan-losses, the
banks and the Regulator11 have so far failed to provide the market with
information that could convince it that this optimistic scenario will play out.
IV  CONTAINMENT
The government’s intervention came on September 30, 2008, during the
most stressful weeks of the global financial crisis, when one of the Irish banks
(reputedly Anglo Irish) apparently proved unable to roll-over its foreign
borrowings and had effectively run out of collateral to refinance at the
European Central  Bank (ECB).12 Although the other banks had not faced
anything comparable, there was a fear of contagion.13 Since the issue was one
of rolling-over wholesale funds, a further increase in the coverage ceiling in
the deposit protection scheme14 would have been ineffective in such a context.
No public indication has been given that the authorities gave serious
consideration to less systemically scene-shifting – and less costly15 – solutions.
For example, they might have provided specific state guarantees for new
borrowings or injections of preference or ordinary shares – approaches that
were widely adopted across Europe and the US in the following weeks. 
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11 The Regulator stated in late 2008 that “Speculative lending to construction and property
development in Ireland amounts to €39.1bn, of which €24bn is supported by additional collateral
or alternative sources of cash flow and realisable security. This leaves a balance of €15bn secured
directly on the underlying property.” (Neary, 2008)
12 A further factor that has been mentioned as influential in the decision was the sharp fall in
bank share prices on September 29, especially an almost halving of the share price of Anglo Irish
Bank. Despite the impression given by some commentators who should know better, falling share
prices have per se no effect on regulatory or economic capital. However, they do serve as a wake-
up call to regulators as to possible overstatement of the likely recoverability of a bank’s loan
portfolio. Furthermore, they can have a knock-on effect on the willingness of depositors and
debtholders to continue to finance the bank.
13 Foreigners were puzzled by the initial set of banks to be covered by the guarantee. Locals knew
perfectly well which banks were regarded as “local” and which as “foreign”. For example, it did not
seem surprising to them that Depfa Bank, until recently with its headquarters in Ireland, but
newly a subsidiary of Hypo RE Bank of Germany was not guaranteed, even though its own
liquidity difficulties in October nearly brought down Hypo, and the parent was indeed
subsequently nationalised by the German Federal authorities.
14 There had been relatively modest but politically conspicuous retail depositor withdrawals in
previous weeks. For example about €½ billion more than usual moved into Government small
savings in September before the guarantee was announced.
15 Blanket guarantees are among the “accommodating” approaches to crisis policy shown by
Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) to have added considerably to the fiscal costs of banking crises
around the world.Textbook recommendations on crisis containment (cf. Honohan and
Laeven, 2005) stress the importance of correctly identifying the source of the
crisis, and this requires inter alia good information about the management,
solvency and liquidity of each of the banks in the system. Judging from official
statements made after the intervention, the Financial Regulator viewed the
liquidity crunch as entirely a consequence of the global situation, and
regarded all of the Irish banks as well capitalised. No question was publicly
raised about quality of management either.
Of course with Irish-controlled banks operating also in the UK (including
the Bank of Ireland’s involvement in running the UK post office savings
scheme) and with foreign-controlled banks active in Ireland,16 the measure
met with opposition from the British authorities as well as the EU on state-
aid grounds. Major UK banks were, at the time, themselves facing stress in
their treasury operations on a day-to-day basis. It was reported that the
European Central Bank (ECB) was informed about the guarantee only
minutes before it was announced. There may have been some flow of UK
deposits into Irish banks in the immediate aftermath of the guarantee, though
available data indicates that there was little (if any) beyond a return of the
modest funds that had flowed out.17
Some have suggested that the Irish scheme served as a demonstration
effect for other national authorities who brought in guarantees, albeit more
limited, in subsequent days and weeks. But these guarantees fall short of the
comprehensive blanket guarantee provided by the Irish government which
even extended to some explicitly subordinated debt (the dated kind was
covered, but not the undated). 
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16 After some days, the Irish government agreed to extend the scheme to subsidiaries and
branches of foreign-owned banks operating in the retail market in Ireland. In the event, all but
one of these declined the offer when they saw the terms of the guarantee and the recovery of retail
customer confidence following the adoption in other countries of bank-strengthening measures.
(The exception, Postbank Ireland, a joint venture between the Irish postal service An Post and
Fortis, a bank which also had to be rescued in October 2008).
17 Interpretation of available data on aggregate deposit movements in the surrounding days and
weeks is complicated by the revelation that there was window dressing around end-September
involving back-to-back deposit transactions between Irish financial institutions (notably a €7
billion deposit placed for one day by a non-bank subsidiary of Irish Life and Permanent with Anglo
Irish Bank) intended to give the impression of larger than actual nonbank deposits in the system.
This is part of the reason why direct evidence of a cash crunch was very muted in the consolidated
statistics for end-September, and little indication of a vigorous inflow of non-resident deposits in
October.V  GOOD PRACTICE IN BANK RESTRUCTURING
The Guarantee Does Not Remove the Need for Capital
The existence of the government guarantee does not remove the need for
banks to have a sizeable cushion of capital, because of the distorted incentives
for risk-taking in an undercapitalised bank. The shareholders of a bank with
little or no true capital have little or nothing to lose if the bank takes risks. A
successful gamble will be good for the insiders; a failed gamble will leave them
no worse off. This is a strong reason for requiring more capital, even if this is
provided by the government or by a passive investor, especially if the
mechanism for injecting it has the effect of leaving the insiders with a stake
in that capital. As long as they share more symmetrically in the gains and
losses, the incentive to gamble for resurrection is greatly reduced.18,19
While such risk-taking would characterise some banks, where the
controlling insiders are substantial shareholders and are involved directly or
indirectly in many of the projects being financed by the banks, there are other
banks for which it is not a realistic picture. These other banks are operated in
a more bureaucratic way by career bank managers who receive most of their
benefits by virtue of staying in control (rather than from an equity share in the
profits). Such managers have a strong incentive to avoid bankruptcy. Times
such as the present induce such managers to become more risk averse for fear
that their actions will lead to bankruptcy. If capital is low, this implies a highly
conservative policy for lending and other activities. This seems closer to what
we are observing in the larger Irish banks today.
Thus, whether bankers are gambling for resurrection, or running for cover
for fear of losing their jobs, more capital is called for. The international
evidence on this point is clear: capital is a prerequisite for recovery (e.g.
Japan), but not a panacea (e.g. Mexico).
Besides, as the end of the guarantee period approaches – though the
likelihood of an extension20 must be recognised – banks will need to be able to
convince their depositors and bondholders that there is a sufficient cushion in
their balance sheet to provide an adequate security. 
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18 A gamble could include making further loans to existing borrowers – possibly including
associates of the insiders who control the bank’s affairs – to enable them to continue to finance
their development schemes, in the hope that their business would improve to the point where
repayment was possible.
19 Insiders at a more deeply insolvent bank may give up on resurrection altogether, and then the
temptation to loot the institutions becomes severe, cf. Akerlof and Romer (1993). An insolvent
borrower may also have the incentive to abscond or to move assets out of reach if the lender is
slow in protecting their interest. 
20 Laeven and Valenciana (2008) provide data on the duration of fourteen such guarantees. The
mean duration was 53.1 months; the median 44.5 months.Textbook Restructuring 
Based on experience with crises around the world, the textbook
prescription for dealing with an isolated critically undercapitalised bank
which is unable or unwilling to inject new capital is for the regulator to act
promptly to seize control of the bank, and to remove the management that has
been responsible for the failure. 
Next come the decisions on loss allocation. Best practice obviously avoids
full socialisation of the costs, instead imposing these first onto shareholders,
then onto subordinated claimholders, and finally onto uninsured depositors. If
there are private shareholders prepared to come in to provide the needed
capital at this stage, thereby obviating losses to other claimants, well and
good. Even if no private sector equity is available, a systemically important
bank may be deemed “too big to fail” and recapitalised with public funds
without being put into liquidation (cf. Stern and Feldman, 2003).
Finally, a new financial structure for the remaining assets and liabilities
has to be decided upon. In order to avoid contamination with the failed
practices of the past, this will often involve separating the impaired assets into
a separate vehicle21 and replacing them with sufficient government bonds
before selling the restructured entity back into the market in whole or in part.
The financial instruments used should give the taxpayer some upside
potential where the injection of funds needed is uncertain (Honohan and
Laeven, 2005).22
The logic of this strategy is partly to ensure that the job is done on a least-
cost basis. But it is also to avoid a recurrence of the problem by preventing
continued operation of an undercapitalised, error-prone bank with a failed
business model and administrative practices, a problematic customer base and
a compromised management facing distorted incentives – in short a “zombie”
bank (Kane, 1989). 
In a systemic meltdown, this prescription can seem both impractical and
unjust, given the degree to which some of the banks have been victims of
circumstances or at least of assumptions that were shared by the Regulator
and by large parts of society (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). Reflecting the
wider systemic aspects, many banks in Europe and the US have received
government financial support in recent months without these drastic steps.
However, the classical intervention policy has nevertheless been deemed
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21 Such as NAMA, discussed below.
22 An ECB recommendation dated 18 December 2008 specifies minimum rates of return on
government funds injected.appropriate for other banks in this crisis and has been put into effect for
several banks in the US23 and elsewhere.24
The Second Wave of Support: Recapitalisation
The Irish Government announced in late December, 2008 that it too would
follow the course of action adopted in October by most European
governments,25 with preference share injections into the three larger banks,
and would be prepared to invest in common stock. (It was to be understood
that the other, smaller, banks would be dealt with later). This second wave of
support also warranted a triage. Clearly, the two largest banks, Bank of
Ireland and Allied Irish Banks (AIB), are deeply embedded in the national
economy and evidently too big to fail. As for the remainder, only the Regulator
could have the full information on which to make a judgment on which banks
are simply the victims of a systemic problem and have nothing of the “zombie”
about them; most observers have formed their own opinion, however.26
Subsequently, citing funding difficulties at Anglo Irish Bank, and the
reputational damage it had suffered following disclosure of the “unacceptable
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23 An excellent example here is the sixth largest US retail bank Washington Mutual, intervened
in late September by the US deposit insurance agency FDIC, with the deposits and most of the
assets bought by JP Morgan Chase for about $2 billion. Shareholders will receive nothing and
investors in WaMu’s unsecured bonds were expected to recover as little as 10 per cent of their
investment.
24 Bradford and Bingley provides a UK example. Its deposits and branch network were bought by
Santander, which received about $1 billion less than the face value of the deposits from the UK
deposit insurance entity FSCS and the UK government. In this case, the assets are being retained
in government ownership. Subordinated debt holders of B&B were not guaranteed in this
arrangement; no shareholder compensation was envisaged.
25 Who have encouraged or insisted on additional capital in their main banks and have made
funds available for injection in the form of ordinary or preference shares (the former giving the
taxpayer a share in the future recovery of the bank’s fortunes, the latter allowing the government
to extract a high but fixed return on its investment.). 
26 Evidently, the third, Anglo Irish Bank, was always going to have a harder time surviving such
a triage. The stock market obviously saw no embedded shareholder value in this entity, with the
share price of just a few cents by late 2008 merely reflecting the potential of a favourable
government bail-out. With only half a dozen branches in Ireland, it is not a retail bank, and
although it claims 200,000 customers, it would not be seen by most independent observers as
systemically important, though it has been declared so in official statements. As far as its
managerial and organisational capacity is concerned, there have been a number of warning flags.
Even more heavily involved than the other large banks in property-related finance, Anglo’s very
rapid growth rate in the past decade has already been noted. The information capital embodied in
its much vaunted client relations with developers might, in the present circumstances, be
regarded as a negative rather than a positive. The manipulation of director loan transactions
which led to the resignation of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the bank in December
2008, provides a further negative signal. (The other bank whose rapid growth was noted above,
Irish Nationwide, was also involved in these manipulations.) The Finance Director and Chief Risk
Officer of Anglo resigned in January 2009.  corporate governance practices” at the bank, the Government announced on
15 January, 2009 that it would be nationalised (with shareholder
compensation to be determined later, based on the report of an assessor), and
the necessary legislation was enacted within days. Injection of further capital
into Anglo was deferred. 
A sum of €3.5 billion was injected into Bank of Ireland at end-March 2009
in the form of 8 per cent non-cumulative preference shares, carrying warrants
and voting rights. A similar sum was provided on the same basis to AIB in
May, though in this case the recipient had to undertake independent steps to
strengthen capital to the tune of an additional €1.5 billion. The announcement
of these injections had little effect on share prices, suggesting that the market
regarded the two banks as still technically insolvent. Indeed, the share prices
were arguably supported mainly by the expectation that further government
support would indirectly favour the position of shareholders.. 
After all, despite the guarantee that is in place, it may not be costless for
the Government or its agencies (ultimately the taxpayer) to inject further
funds: sizeable unguaranteed subordinated debt – amounting to several
billion euros – remains in the balance sheets of the banks. If loan losses are
larger than are now being projected by the banks, unguaranteed subordinated
debtholders would, under the present financial structure, be exposed to losses;
but an injection of capital junior to these liabilities would transfer the burden
of those losses to the taxpayer. This important point continues to receive
insufficient attention.
VI  SEGREGATING PROPERTY LOANS: NAMA
Continued share price weakness, and increasing reliance on bank
borrowingfromtheECB(Figure10)27ensuredthat further steps to recapitalise
the banks and remove the worst overhanging problem assets from their
portfolio could not be indefinitely postponed. In early April 2009, the
Government outlined its plans for a huge asset purchase scheme, designed to
replace between €80 and €90 billion (book value) of loans from the banks’
balance sheets with low risk and marketable Government-guaranteed bonds
requiring less regulatory capital backing. The loans are to be written down to
market value before being purchased and the Government has clearly stated
that any necessary further recapitalisation by it would be made in the form of
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27 Aggregate deposits from the ECB at all credit institutions jumped from €44 billion at end-
August 2008 to €113 billion at end-February 2009 – the latter figure approaching 70 per cent of
GDP. In contrast, outstanding debt securities issued by the banks to non-residents (of Ireland) fell
by over €40 billion in the same period. new equity.28 Such an equity injection would strongly – perhaps fully – dilute
the current shareholders’ interest, depending on the scale of the write-down
that proves necessary.29
The loans purchased in this operation are to include all of the development
property related loans as well as “the largest property-backed exposures” of
the participating banks. By centralising the development property portfolio of
the banking system in a National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) – and
removing problem loans from the lending teams that made them – it is hoped
that a better job will be made of managing loan recovery. 
Whatever price is paid for the assets purchased, the taxpayer is absorbing
risks from shareholders and creditors of the banks.30 This risk-shifting
extends beyond the lifetime of the current bank guarantee, and extends to
those who are not currently guaranteed, as well as to the shareholders. 
Concerns that the taxpayer would end up paying too much because of
deficient pricing could be allayed by refining the NAMA proposal in a way that
also achieves a better risk-sharing. Instead of simply paying a fixed best-
estimate price for the loans, a somewhat more sophisticated financial
restructuring could be envisaged. Specifically, NAMA should make a two-part
payment. One part is in bonds, but is pitched below the estimated value of the
assets purchased. In addition, the bank shareholders – and possibly other risk
capital providers – would be given some stake in the upside of NAMA’s
eventual returns (for example by giving them an equity stake or warrant in
NAMA). This would protect the taxpayer while being fair to the shareholder,
and still removing the risk from the bank. This plan would, of course, increase
the likelihood that the shareholder’s equity in the banks is wiped out following
the asset sale, with the Government then holding a 100 per cent ownership
stake, at least until new equity investment can be raised.
Achieving a good governance of NAMA is evidently crucial to ensure that
it achieves its goals. But this is not easy to ensure. For example, transparency
could run up against current banking secrecy laws: this issue cannot be
brushed under the carpet if the integrity and credibility of NAMA is be
assured. After all, many of the borrowers whose loans are being transferred
are high-profile individuals who will vigorously contest efforts of the loan
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28 This distinguishes the Irish plan from the asset purchase schemes contemplated by successive
US Treasury Secretaries Paulson and Geithner.
29 It is in this context that recent calls for nationalisation of the banks should be considered. If the
Government statements are taken at face value, they will in fact nationalise the banks (despite a
stated reluctance to see this outcome) if the write-downs are sufficient to wipe-out shareholders’
capital. Market expectations are that such an outcome seems increasingly likely.
30 Admittedly, the plan also contemplates a levy (on whom?) to be imposed if the price paid should
subsequently prove to be too high. However, this levy cannot be envisaged as applying to the bank
from whom the loans were purchased without nullifying the key risk-reducing element of the plan.recovery operation. It is hard to see how costly and protracted litigation, not
only on the constitutionality of the proposed scheme, but subsequently on
individual recovery action, can be avoided. Ensuring that NAMA can overcome
these difficulties and achieve the hoped-for efficiencies in recovery will be a
challenge. The mandate of NAMA will also have to be unambiguous: if its
recovery actions threaten employment will it be asked to stay its hand? Like
state-owned banks all over the world, it is very easy for an asset management
company to morph into an off-budget grant agency incurring hidden additional
costs to the taxpayer.
Some of the Asset Management Companies put in place to deal with bank
insolvency in various countries over the past quarter century have been
deemed successful. The Swedish case is often mentioned, though at less than
8 per cent of GDP, it was managing a much smaller portfolio than envisaged
for NAMA (50 per cent of GDP). The US and Spanish schemes of the 1980s also
did well, but they were even smaller. The jury is still out on others, including
the massive scheme in China, now into its second decade of operation. Some
did not fare so well, including those of Mexico, Indonesia, Philippines and
Senegal, all of which were contaminated by politicisation. With Ireland’s
stronger societal institutions we should be able to avoid some of these pitfalls,
but only if there is careful planning and if adequate legal and administrative
structures are put in place. There is no obvious template which can be simply
transplanted here.
After the write-downs, the banks too will likely be wholly or largely State-
owned. This will give rise to similar issues of governance and of the potential
conflict between pursuit of shareholder value and some short-term politically
sensitive consequences of prudent bank practice. 
VII  GETTING LENDING GOING AGAIN AND AVOIDING
UNWARRANTED FORECLOSURES
Evidence on Changing Loan Supply Conditions
Ireland is far from unique in experiencing a credit crunch. This is not
attributable to an absolute shortage of loanable funds: Ireland’s banks have
access to adequate funding thanks to the blanket guarantee, even if the terms
on which those funds can be obtained is less favourable than before, not least
because the cost of funds to the Irish government has jumped.31
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31 The secondary market spread for 10-year bonds over the German benchmark jumped from
about 30 basis points in mid-September to reach about 150 basis points at end-December 2008 and
exceeding 250 basis points in January after the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank, later drifting
up to a peak of 284 basis points in March before recovering somewhat later.Instead, as elsewhere, it is banks’ reluctance to assume additional credit
risk in these uncertain times that dictate tightening of lending conditions. 
The ECB’s survey of credit demand and standards suggest that credit
tightening for enterprises started no earlier than the Summer of 2007 – and
followed rather than preceded a fall in enterprise demand (Figure 6). The
entry “3” in the chart indicates no change in standards from the previous
quarter, the figure shows that lending standards continued to tighten quarter-
by-quarter since then. Banks also reported shrinking demand from
enterprises, as they themselves deferred expansion plans, and despite the
likely need of enterprises to finance inventory and for distress borrowing.
For households, the pattern is similar but with an even longer lag between
the fall in demand (started in early 2007 with the fall in house prices), and the
tightening of lending conditions, which began only after October 2007.
This survey reports the opinions of bankers, and it provides a useful
contrast to the clamour from unsatisfied borrowers. In any downturn, it is the
non-creditworthy distressed would-be borrowers who naturally are most vocal
in complaints about a credit crunch. At the same time, taxpayers are
concerned about the fiscal costs of a further expansion in non-performing
loans. This generates a delicate balancing act for the policymaker. As already
discussed, additional capital can help restore lending confidence of the
managerial banks, but there is no automatic multiplier, and experience
elsewhere, both current and historic, suggests that this will be a slow process. 
Avoid Drip Feed: Borrowing Corporations in Distress Need Restructuring Too
For non-financial corporates, a key lesson from crisis experience elsewhere
is that distressed firms need to be decisively restructured, and not kept alive
on a drip-feed. The dangers here apply especially to property-based
companies, but also to others (Ahearne and Shinada, 2005; Caprio and
Honohan, 2005). In other words, parallel to the financial restructuring of
banks, there needs to be work ensuring that surviving non-financial firms are
financially solid. This can be done largely by the market; the barriers to
prompt action here are likely to come from banks that are in denial about the
true financial condition of their biggest borrowers, and from political pressure.
Mortgage Relief for Households – Avoid Risky and Unfair Approaches 
Discussions in the US, where actual mortgage defaults and delinquencies
have been a prominent part of the problem, have centred around renegotiation
of loans to enable willing but distressed borrowers to stay in their homes,
thereby avoiding the deadweight losses of foreclosure. Some of these proposals
involve tax-payer assistance, but others can be a win-win situation for both
borrower and lender, though bankers are reasonably nervous about such
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schemes encouraging wilful delinquency by those able to pay.32 Where
predatory lenders mis-sold low income households mortgages which they
never had a realistic chance of servicing, there is a strong ethical case for
provision of public relief. 
Avoiding wasteful foreclosure is also a standard goal in Irish mortgage-
lending. But the case for taxpayer-funded relief is less clear, not least in
relation to mortgages on second homes taken out by relatively prosperous
borrowers. Such a policy could be regressive overall as well as contributing to
severe moral hazard. Any extensive loan-forgiveness programme would
threaten fiscal stability directly or indirectly. Overall, in the Irish context,
relief for distressed households who can no longer service their mortgages
would seem to be better dealt with through social welfare policy rather than
banking policy.
Government Control Over Bank Lending Decisions?
It might be thought that nationalising the banks on a semi-permanent
basis and requiring them to pursue government objectives instead of profit
would ensure an increased flow of lending enhancing the public good. But the
evidence from around the world is that private for-profit banking systems
have, in normal times, contributed more to growth (and poverty reduction)
than government-controlled ones. The latter, responding to political pressures,
tend to keep large but faltering borrowers afloat for much longer than is
healthy for the economy as a whole (cf. World Bank, 2001, 2008, for reviews of
the evidence). So, even for banks over which it acquires a controlling stake, I
would not be advocating close administrative direction over lending policies.
Government may wish to shape the overall strategy for its banks, but should
remain at arms length from lending policy.
Regulation: Beware of Over-Regulation that Constrains Loan Availability
The Irish banks are heavily indebted to foreign lenders and operate with
very high loan-to-deposit ratios. It would have been better if they had not got
into this situation, but a rush to reduce this ratio could be disastrous for the
economy’s ability to ride out the global recession. Even if a government
guarantee is needed for an extended period, this should be made available in
order to ensure that a shortage of loanable funds does not take over from risk-
aversion as the chief reason for the credit crunch in Ireland. Happily, early
concerns that the Regulator might be putting the banks under pressure to
reduce loan-to-deposit ratios seem to have been misplaced.
32 Such renegotiations can be greatly complicated because of legal constraints if the loans have
been repackaged into securities and sold to numerous investors.Nevertheless, the danger of regulatory over-reaction must be present, and
there is insufficient evidence in the public domain as to the current stance of
regulatory policy. Reforms to incentive structures for management would of
course be good. But much of the current global rethinking of regulatory design
will not necessarily be particularly relevant to the Irish scene: the Irish
problems relate to a very old-fashioned credit boom and not to financial
innovation. The failure was one of insufficient scepticism on the part of the
Regulator. With hindsight, it seems evident that the Regulator should have
insisted on much more pessimistic loan-loss provisioning on developer loans.
The adjustment to capital requirements for high LTV residential mortgages
should have been much higher. Beyond that, the danger to be avoided now is
that the Regulator might be inclined to impose requirements that discourage
exactly the lending that is needed to protect the economy through the
downturn and position it for a recovery. 
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